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LETTER DATED 21 APRIL 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 20 April 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Memorandum dated 20 April 1994 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The recent developments in international relations over the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula have assumed dimensions of serious confrontation.

The situation has presented much greater complexity particularly since 31 March, when the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement imposing unreasonable follow-on inspections on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The United States of America and its satellite forces have resorted to the one-track course of pressure by enjoining full-scope inspections under the Safeguards Agreement on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea without regard to the unique status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which has temporarily suspended the effectuation of its declared withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and such action has placed grave difficulties in the way of efforts to resolve the nuclear issue.

The nuclear issue today stands at a crossroads where the issue can be resolved through dialogue and negotiations in keeping with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique NPT status or the issue will remain unresolved permanently because of strong-arm actions and confrontation.

In view of the current situation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issues this memorandum in order to shed light on the major obstacles blocking a resolution of the nuclear issue and the truth behind them.

I. THE ORIGIN OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S UNIQUE NPT STATUS AND ITS ESSENCE

The key to resolving the nuclear issue is a fair and step-by-step solution befitting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status based on its temporary suspension of the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from NPT.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea finds itself in a unique status based on its temporary suspension of the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from NPT.

As is known already, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced its decision on 12 March 1993 to withdraw from NPT in order to safeguard supreme State interests, in accordance with paragraph 1 of article X of the Treaty. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's decision to temporarily suspend the effectuation of s withdrawal from NPT, as contained in the 11 June 1993 joint statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, was a provisional measure which the Democratic People's Republic of Korea undertook unilaterally on the premise that the negotiations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United

States of America for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue would continue on an equal and unprejudiced basis.

This implies that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States are clearly the legal parties responsible for the suspension of the effectuation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty. As far as the Safeguards Agreement is concerned, the Agreement was concluded pursuant to paragraph 4 of article III of NPT, and therefore the legal validity of the Agreement has been as good as suspended since 12 June 1993, when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty was to come into force in the absence of any subsequent particular agreement thereon between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This notwithstanding, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA have so far managed to reach a bilateral agreement on the limited-scope inspection activities which have been carried out accordingly. This was possible entirely thanks to the voluntary goodwill steps taken by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in order to demonstrate the transparency of its nuclear activities.

The United States and the IAEA secretariat, too, have recognized the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique NPT status.

At the working-level contact in New York on 10 December 1993 between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Thomas Hubbard said "the United States understands the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status resulting from its temporary suspension of the effectuation of the declared withdrawal from NPT" and "we want the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to accept technical requirements for maintaining the continuity of safeguards, not the Agency's legal requirements".

Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Robert L. Gallucci, Head of the United States delegation to the talks between the two States, addressed a message on 2 February 1994 to his Democratic People's Republic of Korea counterpart, in which he said, "we understand that inspections sought by IAEA for the continuity of safeguards are designed to ensure non-diversion of nuclear material since the previous full inspection".

This is a de facto acceptance by the United States that the inspection needed for the continuity of safeguards is not a routine or ad hoc inspection under the Safeguards Agreement, but an inspection limited only to the purpose of verifying that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since February 1993, when the inspections required by the Safeguards Agreement were suspended. At the same time, this also serves as clear evidence that the United States has accepted and respects the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's current unique NPT status.

IAEA, too, has recognized the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status in the practice of its inspection activities. In his report of 24 March 1994 to the Security Council on the results of the Agency's March inspection activities in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Director

General of IAEA stated that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea said it needed only to ensure the continuity of safeguards because of its unique status.

And in this sense the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accepted the Agency's inspections in May and August 1993 for the servicing and reloading of the surveillance equipment. This is none other than an acceptance by IAEA itself of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status.

Had the IAEA secretariat had any sound reasons or grounds to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement, it would never have agreed to such an extremely limited inspection aimed only at servicing and reloading the surveillance equipment, as referred to by the Agency's Director General.

The same is the case with the March 1994 inspection of which the Agency has made an "issue". In his above-mentioned report, the Agency's Director General said that in reaching the agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA on 15 February 1994, which became the basis for the latest inspection, "we discussed only the contents of the inspection needed, at the present juncture, for maintaining the continuity of safeguards, not the legal grounds for the inspection".

In the final analysis, the IAEA secretariat has proved by itself that it could not deny the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status in relation to the Safeguards Agreement but accepted and tolerated its unique status and, on this basis, has performed its inspection activities.

Despite these facts, the United States and the Agency secretariat are still talking about "non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement" and "full inspection", stressing that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea should yet fully live up to its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement.

Such action clearly shows that they are using the leverage of the Safeguards Agreement for attaining their dishonest political objectives, strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's political system.

Masterminded by the United States, the IAEA secretariat convened a meeting of the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 March 1994 to deal with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's so-called "nuclear issue" and engineered the adoption by the Board of a "resolution", which says that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea "is in further non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement by not allowing IAEA inspectors to conduct indispensable inspection activities to verify that there had been no diversion of nuclear material".

In its Presidential Statement dated 31 March 1994, the Security Council "calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to allow the IAEA inspectors to complete the inspection activities ... as a step in fulfilling its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement and in honouring non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty". This is also clearly nothing but a demand that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agree to full implementation of the Safeguards Agreement. The persistency with which the United States and IAEA have called for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's full implementation

of the Safeguards Agreement is based on their intention to categorically negate the legality of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's current unique status and to justify their machinations of strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Even in the light of the premise on which the Safeguards Agreement was approved, the legal effect of the Agreement is, in fact, as good as suspended.

On 9 April 1992, the third session of the Ninth Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea considered the Safeguards Agreement to be concluded between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA and adopted and announced its resolution approving the Agreement, "on the premise that none of the depositaries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will either deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula or resort to nuclear threat against us".

But the elimination of the nuclear threat by a depositary of the Treaty against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - which is included in the above-stated premise - remains yet to be achieved, and the United States, one of the depositaries, is on the contrary further increasing its nuclear threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, particularly by openly disclosing its intention to resume the "Team Spirit '94" joint military exercises, a nuclear war test targeting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and massing its armed forces on and around the Korean peninsula. Such actions on the part of the United States destroyed the legal basis of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's approval of the Safeguards Agreement and create circumstances that prevent the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from implementing the Safeguards Agreement.

The IAEA secretariat is a party to the Safeguards Agreement, but the partiality and injustice of its actions give the Democratic People's Republic of Korea unambiguous grounds to withhold full implementation of the Safeguards Agreement.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides in paragraph 1 of article 60 that "a material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part".

The IAEA secretariat fundamentally breached the Safeguards Agreement when it artificially fabricated the so-called "inconsistencies" and, on the basis of the intelligence information forged by the United States, triggered an Agency "resolution" calling for "special inspection" aimed at opening up the "two military sites" of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, another party to the Safeguards Agreement. Therefore, it follows, as a matter of course, that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as a party to the Agreement, is entitled to the legitimate right to suspend the effect of the Agreement in whole or in part.

II. THE CONSISTENT EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR THE CONTINUITY OF SAFEGUARDS

Despite the extraordinary situation characterized by its unilateral decision to suspend temporarily the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from NPT, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has provided its sincere cooperation to the IAEA inspection activities needed for the continuity of safeguards at its nuclear facilities, as an expression of its willingness to demonstrate the transparency of its peaceful nuclear activities.

In keeping with its promise to the United States, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has placed the nuclear activities within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's territory strictly under IAEA surveillance.

At present, the IAEA-installed containment devices at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's five-megawatt Experimental Atomic Power Plant and the Radiochemical Laboratory alone include over 40 metal seals and more than 10 paper seals, gamma mappings at 20 points, over 50 sheets of status change identification photographs and the spike liquid for freezing processes at five vessels, and the Agency's surveillance devices installed at these facilities are six surveillance cameras, one spent fuel rod counter and three thermal luminescence detectors. This is unquestionable evidence that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities remain under the double and triple systems of IAEA strict containment and surveillance.

In early December 1993, an IAEA spokesman admitted that the continuity of safeguards is maintained at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities, saying "the surveillance system is in operation with double and triple backup systems of complementary facility containment and surveillance devices, and its unique character is that any malfunction of a certain device falls short of determining the interruption of the continuity. Therefore, the absence of inspection cannot lead to a total impossibility of safeguards surveillance".

Even at present, the surveillance cameras and containment devices installed by IAEA still remain in place at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's facilities.

Whenever the IAEA secretariat proposed to send inspection teams for the purpose of maintaining the continuity of safeguards, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed to receive the inspection teams and allowed them to replace the tapes and accessories of the surveillance equipment, to identify the seals and to conduct physical inventory verification activities required for the continuity of safeguards surveillance.

Such sincere efforts by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea resulted in successful inspections by the Agency for the continuity of safeguards in May and August 1993, when the Agency inspectors services and reloaded containment and surveillance devices at the five-megawatt Experimental Atomic Power Plant and the Radiochemical Laboratory, the two facilities to which IAEA attaches importance.

In view of the size and present condition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities, the containment and surveillance devices installed at these major facilities alone are enough to fully verify non-diversion of nuclear material to other purposes in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In his telex dated 14 September 1993 to the Director-General of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy, the IAEA Director General pointed out that the inspection activities in May and August 1993 helped to maintain the continuity of safeguards knowledge.

Even in the extraordinary circumstances following its temporary suspension of the effectuation of its withdrawal from NPT, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea took goodwill steps of accepting the IAEA inspections necessary for the continuity of safeguards of its nuclear facilities.

Motivated by its desire to fulfil in good faith both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America Agreed Conclusions and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-IAEA agreement, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea received the Agency inspection team on schedule in March 1994 and allowed the inspection team to perform sufficient inspection activities for maintaining the continuity of safeguards at the seven declared facilities.

These activities include servicing and reloading of the containment and surveillance devices as well as the "verification of physical inventory" of nuclear material. Such inspection activities have helped to fully verify non-diversion of nuclear material from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities and to provide firm assurances of the continuity of safeguards.

Pravda, dated 29 March 1994, said "IAEA has no evidence that North Korea has breached the international rules in the field of nuclear technology" and commented "the inspectors did not find out anything to prove their claim for an alleged military orientation of the research work there".

The Republic of Korea's Radio No. 1 quoted on 16 March 1994 the IAEA inspection team as reporting that "during the just concluded inspection in North Korea ... they carried out inspection activities, including the reloading of the surveillance equipment on a more progressive scale than the previous inspections".

On 28 February 1994, a United States Government official told a press interview, "the infrared photographs from the American reconnaissance satellite have revealed mostly that North Korea did not extract plutonium over the past year". Leonard Specter, senior researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said, "as for my understanding, there has been no problem at the reactor. After the inspection was complete, there has been no indication that the fuel was removed", and added, "they would not have this plant opened up for the world to see if they wanted first and foremost to try to build up their nuclear weapons programme".

United States Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord and other United States officials concerned also said, "through the Agency's inspection, it is almost certain that North Korea has not engaged in any further reprocessing activities since it announced its decision to pull out of the Treaty".

The restriction of the inspection of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities to a limited inspection only for the continuity of safeguards is an inevitable case befitting the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status.

During the period from 1 to 15 March 1994, when the inspection activities took place, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea did not allow smear-taking in the glove-box area and gamma mapping for the filtering device at the Radiochemical Laboratory requested by the inspection team because it was an inordinate demand, going beyond the scope of maintaining the continuity of safeguards. If, at that time, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had allowed the requested samplings and measurements unrelated to the continuity of safeguards, then the IAEA secretariat would have played on it to frame up "inconsistencies" again, as it did previously, and would have complicated the matter by talking about "special inspections" and so forth.

In reality, the IAEA secretariat is now raising a hue and cry, as if the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's alleged restriction of the scope of the recent inspection activities were responsible for a so-called non-implementation of the 15 February 1994 Democratic People's Republic of Korea-IAEA agreement. This shows that the Agency secretariat continues seeking its dishonest political purposes by distorting the truth in an attempt to impute all the responsibilities to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Agency secretariat's unwarranted demand for samplings and measurements at the Radiochemical Laboratory during the recent inspection constitutes a clear violation of the 15 February 1994 agreement, designed exclusively for maintaining the continuity of safeguards.

As for the disputed smear-taking in the glove-box area of the Radiochemical Laboratory, for which the Agency secretariat insists on the "completion of inspection", the smear-taking has no relevance at all to the continuity of safeguards but falls into the category of the verification of correctness and completeness of the initial report on nuclear material. The smear-taking in this area is directly related with the so-called "inconsistencies" which still stand unresolved between the two sides, and this the Agency already knows well. However, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea showed a highly cooperative spirit by recommending a sample-taking of the spike liquid for the inspectors to conduct an effective verification in the glove-box area and assisting them in sampling the spike liquid. Analysis of this sampled liquid alone is more than enough to determine non-diversion of nuclear material.

Despite these facts, the Agency secretariat made an unjust and unilateral conclusion, namely, that it "remains unable to verify that there has been no reprocessing activity at the Radiochemical Laboratory" and referred the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's "nuclear issue" to the Security Council,

an action which cannot be viewed otherwise but clearly as a calculated anti-Democratic People's Republic of Korea stratagem.

Any inspections under the Safeguards Agreement will never be allowed, as long as the current situation continues with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status based on its temporary suspension of the effectuation of its declared withdrawal from NPT.

The inspection activities that befit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's current unique status are only the inspection activities necessary for maintaining the continuity of safeguards.

The case is the same with regard to an inspection of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's normal peaceful nuclear activities. How long the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status will last depends entirely on when the United States renounces its nuclear threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as well as its policy of antagonizing and strangling it and, at the same time, when the Agency redresses its partiality and injustice to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status would naturally terminate if a further round of talks took place between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States and simultaneously steps were taken with a view to resolving the nuclear issue once and for all on the principle of the proposed package solution.

III. THE INJUSTICE OF APPLYING DOUBLE STANDARDS TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA'S "NUCLEAR ISSUE"

At present, the IAEA secretariat and the Security Council, both in support of the United States policy of antagonizing and strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, are openly applying their extremely discriminatory and prejudiced double standards to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's "nuclear issue".

Under United States manipulation, some officials of the IAEA secretariat manoeuvred the adoption of the unjust anti-Democratic People's Republic of Korea "resolutions" one after another, charging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with so-called "non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement", and systematically tried to bring the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's "nuclear issue" to the United Nations.

The Security Council, also under United States behind-the-scenes manipulation, is used as a forum for an unwarranted discussion of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's "nuclear issue" against the purposes and principles of its Charter.

International law must be applied without any prejudice to all States, irrespective of the size of their territories or the number of their population. The international organization connives at the United States posing a nuclear threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and instead brings unilateral pressure to bear upon the victimized Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This is a clear example of application of double standards.

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat are unreasonably provoking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea over its peaceful nuclear activities, while conniving at the United States-patronized countries developing nuclear weapons.

In the practice of its inspection activities, IAEA defends some countries using their nuclear facilities for military purposes, saying "those are undeclared facilities", or "they are buildings about which there is no other available information related to the existence of nuclear materials".

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat have conducted more than 100 rounds of inspections in other countries but never made an issue of the tell-tale nuclear weapons development programme in some of these countries. But after only six rounds of inspections in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, they fomented suspicions about alleged "nuclear weapons development" in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and pushed through a Board of Governors resolution calling for "special inspection". This is a graphic illustration of how far their double standards policy has gone against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On 1 April 1993 the Editor of the Tanzania newspaper Motomoto said that the United States feigns ignorance of the nuclear development programme in some countries but, on the other hand, it "persists in its efforts to fault North Korea's alleged 'nuclear development' and its declared intention to withdraw from NPT despite its faithful implementation of the NPT obligations because, in a nutshell, that nation is regarded as a cancerous entity hampering the United States attempts to establish a new global order".

The Bangkok Post, dated 15 April 1993, carried an article entitled "Why nuclear arms is based on racial discrimination" which says double standards are now applied clearly towards the attitude of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which has expressed its displeasure over the discriminatory nature of NPT and announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty, on the one hand, and towards the attitude of certain countries that have acknowledged having produced nuclear bombs with equivalent fire power to that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima during the Second World War on the other.

Pravda dated 30 March 1993 also reported, "many observers are highly suspicious of the nuclear programmes of a number of countries, which remain out of sight of the United States and IAEA", and deplored: "the United States demand for North Korea's acceptance of inspections of its military sites is astonishing".

The abnormal situation is such that the nations on which sanctions should be imposed go unchallenged while pressure is imposed on an innocent nation.

Some officials of the IAEA secretariat connived at the nuclear weapons development programme of United States patronized countries but, in the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, they did not hesitate to use openly the forged intelligence information and satellite photographs from a third country which are forbidden to be used for inspection activities, in a desperate attempt to create a "suspicion about the nuclear development" in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

None of the provisions in the IAEA Statute and the Safeguards Agreement stipulates usability of a third country's intelligence information in the Agency's inspection activities.

However, some officials of the IAEA secretariat have breached the IAEA Statute and the Safeguards Agreement by systematically using falsified intelligence information from a third country for their inspections at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities.

On 16 November 1990, the Japanese Jiji news service disclosed that, in a bid to arouse suspicion about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear activities, the United States "adventurously faked up" reconnaissance satellite photographs and circulated them among the IAEA secretariat and the Western countries to peddle around the "suspected nuclear arms development programme" in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The Washington Post dated 27 April 1993 acknowledged that "the Clinton Administration provided IAEA with photographs from the United States reconnaissance satellite as evidence of 'North Korea's nuclear weapons development programme'".

A United Kingdom newspaper, Daily Affairs International, dated 4 April 1994, carried an article by its deputy editor Keith Bennett, entitled "Why should the third world nations defend North Korea?", which says:

> "The International Atomic Energy Agency has conducted inspections in this country and given it a 'clean bill of health' that the nuclear facilities in the country are used only for peaceful purposes. But, when the United States Central Intelligence Agency presented photographs from its eye-in-the-sky satellites, IAEA made a surprise move by pressing North Korea to accept 'special inspection', in wanton violation of the IAEA Statute providing against the use of information from extraneous sources to the purpose of its inspection activities. This is an example of the double standards applied by IAEA."

In reality, during the February 1993 meeting of the Agency's Board of Governors, the IAEA Director General screened the slide films of the forged satellite picture provided by the United States in an attempt to create a suspicion that a certain military site in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a "nuclear waste storage". In his address on 14 April 1993 to a conference on the Japanese atomic industry at Yokohama, the IAEA Director General stated openly that he would "continue using the United States intelligence information about the two locations around Nyongbyon for the Agency's inspections and go on obtaining North Korea's nuclear-related information from third countries even if North Korea may protest".

As seen in the above, the previous routine and ad hoc inspections conducted by IAEA were not inspections aimed at verifying the correctness and completeness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's initial report on nuclear material but they were, from the outset, IAEA-coated United States inspections to fabricate pretext for strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on the basis of the intelligence information forged by the United States.

Moreover, some officials in the IAEA secretariat have systematically dished out to the United States and other hostile forces the confidential information to which they had obtained access in the course of the inspections at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities.

These actions constitute a gross violation of the provision of the Safeguards Agreement on protecting secrets and other confidential information coming to their knowledge during inspections. After all, the inspections at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities were, in the true sense of the word, "no-secret inspections" and "open inspections", and they were "joint inspections" and "cooperative inspections" under the "quadripartite system of coordination" of the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea and IAEA.

All the above-cited facts show that the double standard policy pursued by the United States and IAEA with respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear issue had reached its culmination and such policy has topped the height of injustice. As can be seen in the above, the attempts to force the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fully implement obligations under the Safeguards Agreement at the present stage are motivated by the malevolent purposes to destroy the basis of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declaration of its decision to withdraw from the Treaty in the long run, by stretching the truth to make an impression that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still remains a full State party to NPT.

As the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has stated in no uncertain terms the reasons for declaring its decision to withdraw from NPT, unless the United States renounces its policy of hostility and nuclear threat campaign against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and unless the IAEA secretariat redresses its partiality and injustice to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's reinstatement in the Treaty will remain absolutely inconceivable and, therefore, full implementation of the Safeguards Agreement will have no meaning at the present stage. Inspection limited strictly to maintaining the continuity of safeguards alone is more than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea can accept in keeping with its unique status based on the temporary suspension of the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from NPT, and only contingent on progress in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America talks.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's unique status was not of its own making intended for its selfish purposes, but it was imposed on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea against its will, by the United States and the IAEA secretariat because of the abnormal situation resulting from their unjust actions.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea sincerely wants such an extraordinary situation to be straightened out as soon as possible and the nuclear issue to be resolved impartially.

To this end, the United States and the IAEA secretariat must clearly realize their responsibility for the origin of the nuclear issue and for its

current complexity, stop resorting to the unreasonable and contradictory method of double standards and pressure any longer, and must seek unprejudiced and substantial ways to resolve the nuclear issue once and for all.

Recent developments give serious lessons that dialogue and negotiations are the only way to attain an early resolution of the nuclear issue and to achieve detente and peace and that pressure and "sanctions" are the path of whipping up conflict and confrontation and thus blocking permanently the possibility of resolving the nuclear issue.

If the United States and the IAEA secretariat continue to resort to an unreasonable pressure campaign, ignoring such lessons of history, the nuclear issue will remain unresolved indefinitely and it will, in turn, entail irretrievable consequences jeopardizing peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.

All the facts show that if they try at the present stage to restore confidence on a step-by-step basis through inspection designed for the continuity of safeguards in line with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's current unique status and at the same time take a serious approach to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America talks, the matters related to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement will be sorted out in due course, and eventually the nuclear issue will be resolved once and for all.